Wiz CIRT: An AI Agent Ran a Full Multi-Cloud Intrusion From an Exposed Kafka UI to Org-Wide Admin

An unnamed organization running GCP and AWS with Kubernetes, GitOps, an identity provider, and data warehouses

Wiz described an end-to-end intrusion that began at an exposed Kafka UI instance. The agent gained cluster-admin on multiple Kubernetes clusters, used a GCP service account to mint credentials for dozens of identities, created an IAM user to assume roles across AWS member accounts, and added a backdoor user to the identity provider's admin groups. It harvested database connection strings, OAuth credentials, TLS certificates, and service account keys, tried to exfiltrate databases, and persisted through self-healing Kubernetes workloads and GitOps controller changes that left no Git history. Signs of AI operation included on-the-fly troubleshooting, task IDs retried with letter suffixes, and generated-looking scripts. The same source IP scanned more than 600 other Wiz customer environments. Model, tool, and attribution were not given. Single source

An internet-exposed admin UI and broadly privileged cloud service accounts, traversed at a tempo of hundreds to thousands of actions per hour