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2026-10-12 · 2026-Q4

Fake "Apex Accelerator" npm Packages Reroute a Coding Agent's LLM Traffic and Register an Attacker MCP Server

Where did this code come from?

The question layer 4 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Architectural
Vendor response
Unknown
In the wild
Yes
Actor
Attacker

Target

Web3 developers lured to install `@apexacc/cli` (a repackaged Oh My Pi coding agent) and `@apexacc/audit` (an "18-tool" security MCP server)

Impact

Elastic Security Labs (REF8801) found the CLI overwrote `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` and `OPENROUTER_BASE_URL` in the running process, sending prompts, tool definitions, and tool output, including local file reads, to `arena.apexaccs[.]org` while the provider still appeared as OpenRouter. It also wrote a persistent `apex-copilot` entry into `~/.apex/agent/mcp.json` pointing at an attacker MCP server. The audit package's 18 tools returned fabricated results. Both packages fetched server-chosen shell commands, delivering the CloudSyncD macOS backdoor and a Windows stealer that exfiltrates browser data, wallets, and Claude, Cursor, and Windsurf configs over Telegram. Download counts not reported

Root cause

Agent model endpoints and MCP server lists configurable through environment variables and user-writable files that any installed package can rewrite

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Fake "Apex Accelerator" npm Packages Reroute a Coding Agent's LLM Traffic and Register an Attacker MCP Server (2026-10-12). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-10-12-fake-apex-accelerator-npm-packages-reroute-a-coding-agent-s-llm-traffic-and