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2026-10-06 · 2026-Q4

Encrypted Web Page Instructions Make GitHub Copilot CLI Send Local .env Secrets to an Attacker in 28 Seconds; GitHub Says It Is Not a Vulnerability

Who actually said "do this"?

The question layer 2 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Architectural
Vendor response
Not a vulnerability
In the wild
No
Actor
Attacker

Target

GitHub Copilot CLI in autopilot mode with Auto model selection

Impact

Adversa AI applied its Cryptographic Context Injection technique to Copilot CLI. A user asks the agent to fetch one URL; the page holds AES ciphertext, decryption steps, and two keys. The agent decrypts the instructions in its own shell, reads local files including `.env.prod` outside the working directory, and fetches an attacker URL with the secrets as a parameter, in about 28 seconds with no confirmation prompt. Microsoft's `mai-code-1.1-flash` completed the chain in 50% of runs, two GPT-5.6 models refused, and Auto routing can assign the vulnerable model without the user seeing it. The same payload in plaintext is refused. Reported September 17; GitHub validated it on October 1 but ruled it not a vulnerability and out of bounty scope. Unfixed

Root cause

Ciphertext passes content guardrails, and the agent itself decrypts and executes the hidden instructions with file and network access in autopilot mode

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Encrypted Web Page Instructions Make GitHub Copilot CLI Send Local .env Secrets to an Attacker in 28 Seconds; GitHub Says It Is Not a Vulnerability (2026-10-06). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-10-06-encrypted-web-page-instructions-make-github-copilot-cli-send-local-env-secrets