Skip to content
AgentProv

2026-09-29 · 2026-Q3

Unsloth Studio: Merely Selecting a Hugging Face Model Ran the Attacker's Python

Who wrote the file that runs on open?

The question layer 5 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Vendor patch
Vendor response
Patched
In the wild
No
Actor
Attacker

Target

Unsloth Studio, the web UI of the Unsloth open-source fine-tuning library, shipped in the `unsloth` PyPI package

Impact

Pillar Security disclosed on September 29, 2026 that Unsloth versions up to 2026.5.10 executed code from a model repository as soon as a user selected the model in Studio, before any weights were loaded or inference run. The backend inspected models with `trust_remote_code=True`, overriding the user's setting, so an `auto_map` entry in a malicious repository's `config.json` pointed Transformers at attacker Python that ran with the operator's permissions, exposing Hugging Face tokens, cloud credentials, SSH keys, training data, and model artifacts. Fixed in 2026.6.9 in June; the maintainers declined to publish an advisory, citing Studio's beta status, so there is no CVE

Root cause

A metadata probe treated "look at this model" as "run this model's code," a pattern that has produced several CVEs in other ML tools

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Unsloth Studio: Merely Selecting a Hugging Face Model Ran the Attacker's Python (2026-09-29). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-09-29-unsloth-studio-merely-selecting-a-hugging-face-model-ran-the-attacker-s-python