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AgentProv

2026-07-11 · 2026-Q3

"Ghostcommit" Hides Prompt Injection Inside PNG Images to Steal Secrets

Who actually said "do this"?

The question layer 2 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Architectural
Vendor response
Unknown
In the wild
No
Actor
Attacker

Target

AI code-review agents Cursor and Google Antigravity (backed by Claude Sonnet, Gemini, and GPT-5.5); Anthropic's Claude Code refused across all tested models

Impact

Instructions hidden as readable text inside a PNG referenced by an `AGENTS.md` convention file drive an agent to read a project `.env` byte by byte and emit the secrets as a tuple of integer constants disguised as ordinary code, slipping past secret scanners. One run leaked an entire `.env` as a 311-integer constant containing API keys, database URLs, and cloud credentials. A survey found 73% of merged pull requests across 300 top repositories reached the default branch with no substantive human or bot review

Root cause

AI code reviewers treat image files as binary blobs and exclude them from analysis, so a prompt injection carried inside an image is never inspected, while encoding stolen secrets as integers evades string-pattern secret detection. Found by Sudipta Chattopadhyay and Murali Ediga (University of Missouri-Kansas City ASSET Research Group)

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: "Ghostcommit" Hides Prompt Injection Inside PNG Images to Steal Secrets (2026-07-11). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-07-11-ghostcommit-hides-prompt-injection-inside-png-images-to-steal-secrets