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AgentProv

2026-07-07 · 2026-Q3

Google Dialogflow CX "Rogue Agent" Cross-Agent Hijack

Primary layerL6 Identity / RunSecondary:L5 Config

Which agent, run, or tenant is this?

The question layer 6 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Vendor patch
Vendor response
Patched
In the wild
No
Actor
Attacker

Target

Google Dialogflow CX agents using Code Block Playbooks with custom Python

Impact

An attacker with `dialogflow.playbooks.update` permission on one Code Block-enabled agent could overwrite `code_execution_env.py` in a shared, customer-invisible Cloud Run runtime, running injected code for every agent in the same Google Cloud project to read live conversations, steal user data, and inject phishing responses

Root cause

A writable setup file in a shared runtime with no isolation between agents, plus unrestricted outbound access and exposed metadata. Found by Varonis; reported November 2025, initially fixed April 2026 and fully resolved June 2026, with no evidence of in-the-wild abuse and no CVE

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Google Dialogflow CX "Rogue Agent" Cross-Agent Hijack (2026-07-07). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-07-07-google-dialogflow-cx-rogue-agent-cross-agent-hijack