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AgentProv

2026-05-11 · 2026-Q2

Mini Shai-Hulud Worm Compromises TanStack, Mistral AI, and Guardrails AI (CVE-2026-45321)

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The question layer 7 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Vendor patch
Vendor response
Unknown
In the wild
Yes
Actor
Attacker

Target

170+ packages across npm and PyPI with 518 million cumulative downloads, including TanStack (42 packages, 84 versions), Mistral AI, Guardrails AI (`guardrails-ai==0.10.1`, project quarantined), OpenSearch, and UiPath

Impact

Credential theft across cloud providers, cryptocurrency wallets, AI tools, messaging apps, and CI systems; GitHub Actions cache poisoning and OIDC token extraction; self-propagation using any publishable npm token, with a dead-man's switch that runs destructive commands if a compromised token is revoked. It was the first documented npm worm to ship valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations

Root cause

Abuse of npm OIDC trusted publishing and CI cache poisoning with malicious install-time hooks, attributed to TeamPCP

CVE

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Mini Shai-Hulud Worm Compromises TanStack, Mistral AI, and Guardrails AI (CVE-2026-45321) (2026-05-11). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-05-11-mini-shai-hulud-worm-compromises-tanstack-mistral-ai-and-guardrails-ai-cve-2026