2026-04-15 · 2026-Q2
Copilot Studio ShareLeak and Agentforce PipeLeak Form-Based Prompt Injection
Who actually said "do this"?
- Fixable
- Vendor patch
- Vendor response
- Patched
- In the wild
- No
- Actor
- Attacker
Target
Microsoft Copilot Studio and Salesforce Agentforce
Impact
Attackers fill public-facing SharePoint or Web-to-Lead form fields with a fake system-role payload; hijacked agents query connected data sources in bulk and email the results to an attacker address with no volume cap, no Human-in-the-Loop prompt, and no trace shown to the employee who triggered the agent; Capsule Security reports the email channel remains exploitable on Agentforce Sub-Agents (formerly Custom Topics) even after Salesforce's remediation
Root cause
Untrusted form inputs concatenated directly into agent context windows; agents simultaneously hold read access to CRM/SharePoint data and authority to send outbound email
CVE
Sources
Catalog
Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Copilot Studio ShareLeak and Agentforce PipeLeak Form-Based Prompt Injection (2026-04-15). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-04-15-copilot-studio-shareleak-and-agentforce-pipeleak-form-based-prompt-injection
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