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AgentProv

2026-04-15 · 2026-Q2

Copilot Studio ShareLeak and Agentforce PipeLeak Form-Based Prompt Injection

Who actually said "do this"?

The question layer 2 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Vendor patch
Vendor response
Patched
In the wild
No
Actor
Attacker

Target

Microsoft Copilot Studio and Salesforce Agentforce

Impact

Attackers fill public-facing SharePoint or Web-to-Lead form fields with a fake system-role payload; hijacked agents query connected data sources in bulk and email the results to an attacker address with no volume cap, no Human-in-the-Loop prompt, and no trace shown to the employee who triggered the agent; Capsule Security reports the email channel remains exploitable on Agentforce Sub-Agents (formerly Custom Topics) even after Salesforce's remediation

Root cause

Untrusted form inputs concatenated directly into agent context windows; agents simultaneously hold read access to CRM/SharePoint data and authority to send outbound email

CVE

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Copilot Studio ShareLeak and Agentforce PipeLeak Form-Based Prompt Injection (2026-04-15). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-04-15-copilot-studio-shareleak-and-agentforce-pipeleak-form-based-prompt-injection